(Working papers, data, and materials might be available upon request. Please, feel free to contact me)
Álvarez-Benjumea, A., and Valentim, V. (2025). The social costs of showing far-right political preferences.
Abstract:
Are some political preferences more costly to express? In this study, we investigate the extent to which individuals face social exclusion for showing far-right political beliefs. We run a field experiment in Madrid where confederates initiate an interaction with random passers-by. We randomize whether the confederate wears a neutral (white) t-shirt or a t-shirt of different parties. Results show that passers-by are more likely to avoid interacting with confederates wearing the t-shirt of a far right party (Vox). This finding holds both when we compare this condition against the neutral t-shirt one or the ones where confederates wear a t-shirt of other parties. Analyses of heterogeneity show that this effect is particularly strong in a left-wing neigbourhood. Our results highlight that the expression of political views is not a direct translation of one’s private preferences, since the social costs of showing those preferences differ depending on one’s ideology. As far-right parties become increasingly successful across the globe, our findings have implications for understanding the reasons why many individuals who espouse their views often do not express them in public.
Punishing Hate: Three Experiments on Counterspeech (Amalia Álvarez-Benjumea)
Abstract: Counterspeech is a direct response to hate speech that seeks to undermine it. It is a form of punishment because it enforces the norm against hateful discourses. Counterspeech reduces the use of hate speech on online platforms and decreases support for “haters” in observers. For this strategy to work, however, counterspeech has to occur sufficiently often. In a series of experiments, I investigate how often observers punish online hate speech, test interventions to increase the frequency of punishment, and explore the micro-mechanisms that explain the effects.
The rate of spontaneous counterspeech in the experiment is less than 6%. Participants with a positive attitude toward the target of hate were more likely to use counterspeech, but no other specific variables had an effect. In a second experiment, we test different interventions to increase the willingness to punish online hate speech. First, I look at whether participants are more likely to respond to hateful messages with counterspeech when they can observe earlier participants have done so. Second, we test whether informing participants of the inappropriateness of using hate before participating in an online platform, thus increasing the salience of the norm, would increase their willingness to sanction such behavior. I find that exposure to counterspeech by anonymous others strongly encourages participants to act against hate. However, increasing the salience of the norm does not affect the number of sanctions. Lastly, I measure the effects on beliefs at the normative and meta-normative levels to explore the mechanisms that drive the findings in experiment two. The results show that sanctioning behavior is contagious: when participants could observe previous sanctions, they were more likely to follow suit. This increase in punishment is associated with a heightened perception of the inappropriateness of hate speech, with no changes in the acceptability of imposing sanctions.
Anti-discrimination norms and cultural membership among minorities in Germany – an experimental study of ‘recognition gaps’ (together with Lucas Drouhot)
Social science research at large suggests that social norms strongly regulate the public expression of prejudice towards ethnic and other minorities. But do these norms equally cover all minority groups? Against whom it is more socially acceptable to express hostility? Who enforces anti-discrimination norms, and in what social contexts? Here, we rely on a large-scale survey experiment to investigate what cultural sociologists have called “recognition gaps” – disparities in the social valuation of different minority groups, leading to differences in the social acceptability of their stigmatization in everyday life. Focusing on the empirical case of Germany, we theorize that stigmatization based on linguistic differences is more socially acceptable than racial stigmatization and hostility towards homosexuals, while religious stigmatization may be socially acceptable depending on the minority involved. Results from four vignettes generally support our expectations, and suggest a hierarchy of worth among minorities, whereby the stigmatization of Jews, Blacks, and homosexuals is generally perceived as unacceptable. Meanwhile, the stigmatization of Russian, Turkish and Arabic speakers, Muslims and refugees does not trigger an anti-discrimination norm to the same extent. We find that the social context and certain socio-demographic attributes strongly moderate norm enforcement. Familiar others are more likely to be sanctioned than strangers, and norm enforcers are more likely to be young and university educated.
Alvarez-Benjumea, A., Freund, L., Luckner, K., Winter, F. Public Signals as Coordination Devices: The Moderating Effect of Group Identity.
Abstract: Experiments on social norm intervention suggest that public information, which creates common knowledge, is more effective in increasing norm conformity than privately disseminated information, regardless of other factors affecting norm conformity, such as group identity. We present a theoretical model and an experimental test of the effect of the channel of dissemination (public vs. private) of a normative message under different levels of group identity on norm compliance in a public goods game with heterogeneous groups of actors. In the theoretical model, we derive an actor’s pecuniary and identity utility, as well as the conditions under which they will coordinate on a correlated equilibrium. In the experiment, we play a public goods game in which we provide the participants with a normative message about the fairness norm. The conditions vary between low/high group identity and public/private information. We test the coordination on the provided fairness norm in each setting. To increase the strength of the test, we introduce heterogeneous endowments. This increases the number of alternative fairness norms on which coordination is feasible. Our results suggest that group identity increases norm compliance, while the public dissemination of normative information has no, or even negative, effects on norm compliance depending on the type of actor in question.
Amalia Alvarez Benjumea 